“DFSCoerce” is another forced authentication issue in Windows that can be used by a low-privileged domain user to take over a Windows server, potentially becoming a domain admin within minutes. The issue was discovered by security researcher Filip Dragovic, who also published a POC.
Filip’s tweet indicated this issue can be used even if you have disabled or filtered services that other currently known forced authentication issues such as PrinterBug/SpoolSample, PetitPotam, ShadowCoerce and RemotePotato0 are exploiting: “Spooler service disabled, RPC filters installed to prevent PetitPotam and File Server VSS Agent Service not installed but you still want to relay DC authentication to ADCS? Don’t worry MS-DFSNM have your back ;)”
A quick reminder: Microsoft does not fix forced authentication issues unless an attack can be mounted anonymously. Our customers unfortunately can’t all disable relevant services or implement mitigations without breaking production, so it is on us to provide them with such patches…
Micropatch Availability
While this vulnerability has no official patch and could be considered a “0day”, Microsoft seems determined not to fix relaying issues such as this one; therefore, this micropatch is not provided in the FREE plan but requires a PRO or Enterprise license.
The micropatch was written for the following Versions of Windows with all available Windows Updates installed:
Windows Server 2008 R2
Windows Server 2012
Windows Server 2012 R2
Windows Server 2016
Windows Server 2019
Windows Server 2022 ..
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0Patch : Micropatching the “DFSCoerce” Forced Authentication Issue (No CVE)
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